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This paper studies some interesting implications of economic
integration in the context of a neoclassical model of international
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New York NY 10027
(212)-854-2512
AFTER MAASTRICHT:
PUBLIC INVESTMENT, ECONOMIC INTEGRATION, AND INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL MOBILITY
by
Richard Clarida and Ronald Findlay
Columbia University and the National Bureau of Economic Research
December 1992
Revised: February 1993
This paper was written for the NBER International
Seminar in Trade held in Brussels, Belgium on December
17-18, 1992. We would like to thank our discussant
Ricardo Faini and participants at the conference for
their comments and suggestions.
AFTER MAASTRICHT:
PUBLIC INVESTMENT, ECONOMIC INTEGRATION, AND INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL MOBILITY
by
Richard Clarida and Ronald Findlay
1. Introduction
Among the many consequences of Europe's post-war movement toward economic
and political integration has been the stimulus it has given to the international
economic theory of such subjects as free trade zones, customs unions, and optimal
currency areas. Many of the important insights in theses fields were anticipated
in a characteristically brilliant and prescient article by Hayek (1939) on "The
Economic Conditions of Interstate Federalism." Hayek argued that any significant
movement toward political integration necessarily entailed adjustments towards
economic integration and that such a combined movement would enhance both
economic efficiency and political freedom.
Economists have traditionally analyzed European integration by studying the
successive relaxation of impediments to the free exchange of goods and factors
among the member nations of the community. Thus, the free trade area requires
only the removal of trade restrictions among members, the customs union calls for
a common external tariff, while a complete economic and monetary union would
permit the freedom of factors and firms to locate in any member country within
a uniform framework of laws and institutions. This approach is the inheritance
from the seminal works of Jacob Viner (1951), James Meade (1953) and Robert
Mundell (1958) from the decade of the fifties.
Our approach to the subject of European economic integration draws from a
diferent tradition within our discipline, a tradition that emphasizes the role
of the state as the provider of public goods, including productive public
"infrastructure" capital as well as public services such as clean streets and
symphony concerts in public parks. Our interest is not in investigating the
removal of barriers to the free flow of goods, capital and workers, but rather
in modeling the potential shifts in public investment and the provision of public
services that may follow from the extension of the domain of decision over the
the provision of public capital and services from the single nation-state through
an "association," "commonwealth" or other manifestation of what Hayek calls
"interstate federalism," to complete unity in some sort of "supranational" state
or "super-state."
Drawing on our previous research (Clarida and Findlay (1991, 1992)) we
begin by presenting a model of a small open economy in which public investment
in productive infrastructure and final public services are provided at their
first-best levels.1 We show that such an economy will approach a long-run
steady state with a unique equilibrium value of public capital and public
services, along with production, trade and consumption levels for the two private
goods that the economy produces with the given labor force and specific inputs
in each sector, as in the Ricardo-Viner model of Jones (1971). If public capital
is initially below the steady-state level, we demonstrate that along the
transition path, gross public investment falls while the provision of public
services rises. That is, along the optimal path, the government shifts from
being primarily a builder of public capital to utimately being a provider of
1
 Other relevant work on the role of public sector inputs in growth and
trade include Aschauer (1989), Barro (1990), and Casella and Feinstein (1990).
public services.
We next turn to the consequences of integration between small open
economies of the type we have just considered. Suppose initially that economic
integration simply takes the form of perfecting capital mobility between two
economies, economies that face the same world prices for tradables and that have
identical factor endowments, technological capabilities, and preferences for
tradeables. The economies differ in that policymakers in one of them, say
France, have a preference that favors a more generous provision of public
services at the expense of lower disposable income as compared with the other
country, say Germany. In the absence of capital mobility, this results in a
higher rate of public investment and larger stock of public capital in Germany
relative to France, and therefore in higher steady-state levels of wages and
returns to both specific factors in Germany.
This difference in returns induces capital to move from France to Germany
until rentals on capital are equalized. We show that, within the structure of
our model, the returns to the other fixed but immobile factor, "land", must also
be equalized. Moreover, we show that the optimal public capital stock is higher
in a world with capital mobility, and that all of the gains from the additional
public capital stock accrue to labor.
Thus, when capital mobility increases as a result of economic integration,
pressures can be generated to "harmonize" the provision of public services and
public capital among member nations. One form that such harmonization can take
is in standardizing and otherwise coordinating public investment in each country
so that the benefits of public capital in one nation "spill over" to others.
We next suppose that integration takes the form of an "interstate
federation" in which the public capital of either country also benefits the
productivity of the other, but in which national sovereignty still reigns over
the provision of public capital. We derive a Nash equilibrium for the rate of
public investment and provision of public services in each country in the steady
state. We show that each nation will to an extent "free ride" on the public
capital of the other, reduce its rate of public investment, and increase the
provision of public services that are enjoyed exclusively by its own citizens.
While each nation provides less public capital, the sum of the two countries'
public capital stocks is greater than in a world without such spillovers, and
hence each nation has the benefit of a higher aggregate public capital stock than
before. Since each nation also enjoys a greater provision of public services,
an interstate federation clearly enhances efficiency notwithstanding the tendency
of each partner to "free ride" on the other's public investment.
We finally consider the most fundamental type of political and economic
integration, the fusion of the partners into a single supra-national entity or
"superstate" in shich the decision on the provision of public investment for
infrastructure is centralized. A single optimization is done over the entire
domain that was formerly divided between interdependent but separate entities
that did not internalize all spillovers. There is thus no "free rider" problem
at the supra-national level. We show that the super-state emerging out of the
fusion of two identical nation-states provides exactly twice as much public
investment and steady-state capital as each one of them would have done
seperately before integration. The efficiency gains from full political and
economic union are therefore even larger than in the case of the interstate
federation in which the "free-rider" problem may arise.
2. Public Investment in a Ricardo-Viner Open Economy
We consider a small open economy populated with L workers and endowed with
Z acres of land and K units of capital. Wheat is produced with land and labor
inputs according to:
(1) W - AZ
while tech is produced with capital and labor according to:
(2) T = AK s(LT)n-6).
As we shall see, the restriction that labor's share in wheat and tech output are
equal simplifies the analysis substantially, and helps to highlight the role
played by international trade in influencing the scale and scope of government
activity.
Productivity in the private sector is augmented by the stock of public
capital A. A evolves according to
(3) A' = A(l-l) + KLA);
where 7 is the rate of depreciation, I is the gross rate of investment, a concave
function of public employment LA. The government also provides public services
S that augment private utility. These are produced with a technology S(LS)
concave in public employment Ls. We assume that government workers are paid the
going wage, and that the wage bill is financed by a lump sum tax.
In this small open economy, the share of private sector labor employed in
the wheat sector <£(p;K/Z) is given by:
(4) 4>(p;K/Z) = 1/(1 + pVsK/Z).
Using this fact, it is easy to show that disposable national income is given by:
(5) Y = AZ6(L-LA-Ls)1-6<f>(p;K/Z)-s;
that is, disposable national income is equal to aggregate private wage income
divided by (1-6) labor's share.
The policymaker acts to maximize the discounted present value of the log




where Ut = SNjUjt and
(7) U.t = Y.tu(p)v(S).
That is, we assume that social welfare is just the sum of individual utilities
and that individual utility of each of the Nj households with income Yjt is
homothetic in W and T and is weakly separable in S. It follows that:
(8) Ut = Ytu(p)v(S).
Note that we also assume that the policymaker's intertemporal elasticity of
substitution is equal to 1.
The optimal rate of public investment I(LA) and the provision of public
services are determined as follows. Differentiating (6) using (5) and (8), we
obtain the first-order conditions:
(9) (l-8)/(L-LA-Ls) = v'S'(Ls)/v(S(Ls));
(10) (l-8)/(L-LA-Ls) = 0I'(LA)/(A(l-y) +
Equation (10) defines the AA schedule. For any given public capital stock
A and provision of public services S and thus employment Ls, the AA schedule
determines the optimal rate of public investment I(LA). The left-hand-side of
(10) is proportional to the marginal social cost of increasing public employment.
The right-hand-side of (10) is proportional to the discounted marginal social
benefit of using the extra public worker to produce public capital. Equation (9)
defines the SS schedule. For any given rate of public investment I and thus
employment LA, the SS schedule determines the optimal provision of public
services. The left-hand-side of (9) is proportional to the marginal social cost
of increasing public employment. The right-hand-side of (9) is proportional to
the marginal social benefit of using the extra public worker to produce public
services.
It is easy to verify that there exists a unique steady-state public capital
stock and provision of public services and that the optimal public capital
accumulation policy is globally stable. In the steady-state, the public capital
stock is constant and equal to the optimal rate of public investment divided by
the rate of depreciation. Thus, the steady-state is determined by the
intersection of the SS schedule with the steady state AA schedule:
(11) (1-S)/(L-LA-LS) = PiI'(Lk)/I(Lk).
Figure 1 depicts the determination of the steady-state rate of public investment
and provision of public services. The properties of the steady-state are
intuitive. In particular, the steady-state public capital stock is decreasing
in the rate 0 at which the policymaker discounts social welfare, while the
steady-state provision of public services is rising in the elasticity a = v'S/v


















An interesting feature of the public capital accumulation process is that,
during the transition to the steady state, the public capital stock, the
provision of public services, and the level of national income all rise together.
When the initial stock of public capital, Ao, is low relative to steady-state,
the marginal social product of public investment I'(LA(0)) is high. Few public
services are provided, and the government finds it optimal to hire labor away
from the private sector to build up the public capital stock. As public capital
is accumulated and labor is released to the private sector, income rises,
reducing the opportunity cost, and thus encouraging the provision, of public
services S(LS) .
3. International Capital Mobility
A principle objective of the 1992 project is to eliminate barriers to the
movement of capital across national borders. In the absence of such barriers,
capital will relocate until returns are equalized throughout Europe. Even with
free trade in goods, returns to capital will diverge if factor prices are not
equalized. In the context of our three factor-two tradeable good model, the
equilibrium rental on machines is given by:
(12) r = pA6K*-1(L-Lk-Ls)1-*(l - 4>(p;K/Z) ^ .
We will now show that differences across countries in o, the elasticity of
household utility with respect to public services, will require differences
across countries in the return to capital in the absence of capital mobility.
a has an especially interesting interpretation when household utility is
homothetic. It is the rate at which households are willing to reduce disposable
income in exchange for a 1 percent rise in the provision of public services.
Thus if o = 2, the representative household is willing to reduce its disposable
income by 2 percent in order to finance a 1 percent increase in the provision of
public services.
From the steady-state first order conditions (9) and (11), we know that the
SS schedule in a high o country lies above the SS. schedule in a low g_ country so
that the a country has a smaller stock of public capital and provides more public
services than does the g_ country. As shown in Figure 2, it is also the case that
the government of a high o country employs a larger fraction of its labor force
than does a low a country. Indeed, since GNP is proportional to wage income, it
is easy to show that the share of government spending in GNP is simply:
(13) G/Y = (1-8) (LA + LS)/(L - 8 (Lh + Ls)) .
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Because a high a country has a smaller steady-state stock of public capital
and a smaller private sector labor force, we see from (12) that the return on
private capital in a high a country must also be lower. Simply put, in a country
that is willing to accept a large reduction in disposable income to finance a
generous provision of public services, there will be fewer workers and less
public capital to be combined with private capital. For all these same reasons,
the rental on the other specific factor land,
(14) v = A8Z6-1(L-Lh-Ls)1-6cf>(p;K/Z)1-s;
will also be lower in the high a country, as will be the private sector wage
bill w(L - L - L ). Moreover, it can be shown that, for plausible parameters,
A S
wages must also be lower in the high a country.
After barriers to international capital movements have been eliminated,
free trade in machines will equalize the rental on machines across countries.
Moreover, using (12), (14), and the condition (4) that wages are equalized across
the tech and wheat sectors, we see that:
(15) r/v = p1/6.
This implies that free trade in machines and final goods is sufficient to
equalize returns on the internationally immobile factor. This result is well
known for the case in which A is exogenous and common across countries. A Cobb-
Douglas production structure with common labor and public capital output
elasticities across the tradeables sectors delivers the additional implication
that v is equalized regardless of cross-country differences in the public capital
stock. Notice that this has the interesting implication that owners of
internationally mobile capital and immobile land have no economic interest in
10
maintaining the public capital stock at the level that prevailed before the
integration of capital markets! Machines can always be shipped abroad and, so
long as the public capital stock is not allowed to decline "too" much, outflows
of labor from the tech sector to the wheat sector will maintain v at the worl
level.
Given the stocks of public capital and levels of government employment
prevailing before integration, it is clear that machines will flow into the low
a country and out of the high a country until the rental on machines is
equalized. The inflow of machines to the low g_ country will boost the output of
tech, raise the marginal product of labor and thus the wage, and induce workers
to shift out of the wheat sector to the tech sector. In the high a country, the
outflow of machines will lower the marginal product of labor and the level of
wages, inducing labor to shift into the wheat sector and thus lowering the output
of tech and boosting the output of wheat. It follows that, given the stocks of
public capital and levels of government employment, free trade in machines,
while leading to convergence in the returns on capital and land, results in a
divergence in wages.
We now examine this sectoral reallocation of labor more closely. Capital
flows occur until the marginal product of capital is equal to the global
equilibrium rate r. From the sectoral mobility of labor and equation (4) we
know that, in low a countries receiving machines, a larger share of the private
sector labor force is attracted to the tech sector. Solving (14) for K/Z as a
function /c(A,L-LA-Ls,Z,p,r), we can obtain an expression for the allocation of
private employment in a world with capital mobility:
(16) <f>(p;K(A,L-Lh-Ls,Z,p,r)) = (Z/(L-L^-LS)) (r/5Ap1/6
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Since workers are paid their marginal product, the equilibrium wage in a world
with capital mobility is given by:
Comparing with (15) we see that, while capital mobility equalizies returns on
capital and land regardless of national endowments of land and stocks of public
capital, wages differ across countries to the extent that the stocks of public
capital differ. Indeed, we see that in a world of capital mobility, workers reap
the entire value of the contribution of public capital to GDP.
In a world without capital mobility, wages and the returns earned by the
fixed factors are proportional to private domestic product. Thus in such a world
workers, capitalists, and landholders all aggree that, given the provision of
public services S, the policymaker should maximize the present value of the
utility derived by consuming private domestic product. In a world of capital
mobility, workers have objectives that differ from those of capitalists and
landholders. Given the provision of public services, workers still wish to
select public investment to maximize utility derived by consuming private
domestic product. We now demonstrate that, in a world of mobile private capital,
a policymaker that maximizes the utility of workers will want to increase the
rate of public investment and to raise the steady-state stock of public capital.
As we have argued above, owners of capital and land have no economic interest in
maintaining the public capital stock at the level that prevails before private
capital becomes mobile.
To see this result, we note that aggregate worker utility is (l-<S)Yu(p)v(S)
where Y is private domestic product. Maximizing (6) subject to (5) and (16),
we obtain the first-order conditions:
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(17) (l-8)/(L-LA-Ls) + 5/(L-LA-Ls) = v'S ' (Ls)/v(S(Ls)) ;
(18) (l-8)/(L-LA-Ls) + 8/(L-LA-Ls) = £ 1 ' (LA)/(1 -6) ( A ( l - A
Comparing (18) with (10), we see that in a world of capital mobility, there is
both an extra cost and an extra benefit to hiring a worker away from the private
sector to produce public capital. The extra cost is that, by shrinking the
private sector labor force today, fewer machines will be attracted to the home
country today, lowering private domestic product. The extra benefit is that
public investment today augments the public capital stock tomorrow, attracting
addition machines and boosting private domestic product. These influences seem
quite general. In the context of our Cobb-Douglas specification, these two
effects balance out: both the cost and the benefit of an extra worker producing
public capital increase by a factor 1/(1-6), the reciprocal of labor's share.
Comparing (17) with (9), we see that in a world of capital mobility, there is an
extra cost to hiring a worker away from the private sector to produce public
services, but no extra benefit. Again, the extra cost is that, by shrinking the
private sector labor force today, fewer machines will be attracted to the home
country today, lowering private domestic product.
We conclude that, in a world of international capital mobility, a
policymaker that maximizes the utility of workers will want to increase the rate
of public investment and to raise the steady-state stock of public capital.
Geometrically, capital mobility increases the opportunity cost of providing
public services and thus shifts down to SS' the schedule defined by (17). We
have just seen that capital mobility leaves the steady-state AA schedule
(18) 1/(L-LA-LS) = pyI>(LA)/(l-8)I(LA);
unchanged. Figure 3 depicts the new steady-state.
13
This analysis highlights a potentially important raechansim by which
economic integration can boost the level of productivity: the mobility of capital
that follows from economic integration can encourage public investment and thus
raise the steady-state public capital stock. We also note that, in the new
steady-state, the provivion of public services and the share of government in GNP
is lower since the marginal social product of an extra private sector worker, a
worker who can attract extra machines from abroad, is higher.
4. Public Capital Spillovers
We now consider the implication of spillovers across national borders in
public capital productivity. In particular, we suppose that technologies at home
benefit from a larger public capital stock abroad. Letting underscores denote
foreign variables, with public capital spillovers we have:
(19) T = (A + A)Ks((l-<l>(p;K/Z))(L-Lk-Ls))1-s;
(20) W - (A + A)Z6(^(p;K/Z)(L-LA-Ls))1-s;
and similarly for the "foreign" country. How do pulbic capital spillovers
influence the rate of public investment at home? Given the level of foreign
public capital stock A = ICL^)/^, public investment at home must satisify:
(21) (l-6)/(L-Lk-Ls) - 0I'(Lk)/(A(l-y) + I(Lk) + A);kLs) (Lk) y) k
which is just a modified AA schedule, as well as (9), the SS equation. Thus
public capital spillovers, by boosting the level of future output for any given
path of public investment, lower the marginal utility of an extra unit of public
capital, but leave the marginal cost unchanged. The AA schedule rotates to the
left, reducing public investment and freeing up resources that can be shifted to
the provision of public services.
In the steady-state with public capital spillovers, public investment must
satisfy the steady-state AA condition:
(22) (l-6)/(L-Lk-Ls) = /ByI'(Lk)/(I(Lk) + KLk))l
The steady-state public capital stock at home falls, and the provision of public
services rises. From the SS schedule, we see that Lg = LA + Ls must fall. Since
I is concave, we know that I(LA)/7 + IQ^)/^ must rise. Thus given the foreign
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public capital stock A = I(LA), public capital spillovers reduce the home public
capital stock but increase total productivity as the home country "free rides"
of the foreign public capital stock. Because the home policymaker can benefit
from a higher level of steady-state productivity with a lower rate of public
investment, more resources are devoted to the provision of public services and
private production. That is, the share of government spending in GNP shrinks.
Of course, the foreign country faces these same opportunities and
constraints given the level of home country public capital stock. It is easy to
show that there exist a unique Nash equilibrium in this game between home and
foreign countries and that this equilibrium is symmetric. In this Nash
equilibrium, the aggregate public capital stock and thus the level of
productivity rises even though each country's public capital stock falls.
Governments spend the "1992 dividend" on a more generous provision of public
services, and the share of government spending in GNP falls in both countries.
This is not the first best outcome. If the "Brussels" social welfare
function is given by the sum of home and foreign utilities:
(23) Ut + U^ = (Yt + Yt)u(p)v(S);
it is easy to verify that at the "Brussels" optimum, public investment, the
provision of public services, and the share of government spending in GNP are
unchanged in a world with public capital spillovers. Thus, relative to the
first-best Brussels optimum, the Nash equilibrium public capital stock in each
country is too small, the Nash equilibrium provision of public services too
generous, the Nash equilibrium share of government spending in GNP is too small,
and the Nash equilibrium level of productivity in each country - while higher
than in a world without public capital spillovers - is too low.
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